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Vehicle Authentication. In recent future, vehicles will establish a spontaneous
connection over a wireless radio channel, coordinating actions and information.
Vehicles will exchange warning messages over the wireless radio channel through
Dedicated Short Range Communication (IEEE 1609) over the Wireless Access
in Vehicular Environment (802.11p). Unfortunately, the wireless communication
among vehicles is vulnerable to security threats that may lead to very
serious safety hazards. Therefore, the warning messages being exchanged must
incorporate an authentic factor such that recipient is willing to verify and accept
the message in a timely manner.
Our Contribution. (i) Coupling fixed and non-fixed vehicle attributes with
the public key, (ii) Optical out-of-band communication channel, (iii) Adaptation
with existing authentication protocols, (iv) Verification.
Previous Work. Vehicles utilize wireless communication standard, i.e., IEEE
802.11pWireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) based on IEEE 1609
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC). Raya and Haubaux proposed
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based vehicle security scheme, however,
an active adversary may launch an impersonation attack. Moreover, roadside
infrastructure is required to provide the most updated Certificate Revocation
List (CRL). Our scheme removes the active participation of roadside units as
well as the regional authorities.
Problem Statement. Every vehicles public key is signed by the authorities
and can be verified by the receiver, still, an impersonation attack among the
moving vehicles is possible. Accordingly, the scenario starts when a vehicle v1
tries to securely communicate with v2 and requests for the public key of v2.
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Vehicle v3 pretends to be v2 and answers v1 with v3 public key instead of v2.
Then v3 concurrently asks v2 for its public key. Vehicle v1 is fooled to establish a
private key with v3 instead of v2, and v2 is fooled to establish a private key with
v3 instead of v1. Vehicle v3 conveys messages from v1 to v2 and back decrypting
and re-encrypting with the appropriate established keys. In this way, v3 can find
the appropriate moment to change information and cause hazardous actions to
v1 and v2.
System Model. (i) Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation
(LASER), (ii) LIght Detection And Ranging (LIDAR), (iii) Autocollimator,
(iv) Physically Unclonable Function(PUF).
Proposed Scheme. The proposed approaches for the vehicle to vehicle
authentication are summarized as below:
Basic Scheme [3] We propose to certify both the public key and
out-of-band sense-able static attributes to enable mutual authentication of the
communicating vehicles. Vehicle owners are bound to preprocess a certificate
(periodically, possibly during the annual inspection procedure) that signs
monolithically both a public key and a list of fixed unchangeable attributes (e.g.,
license number, brand and color) of the vehicle (extending ISO 3779 and 3780
standards). With such a scheme the vehicle can verify (say by using a camera)
that the public key belongs to the specific vehicle to which the connection should
be established (rather than a public key of a standing by adversary).
Intermediate Scheme [1] We consider the case of multiple malicious vehicles with
identical visual static attributes. Apparently, dynamic attributes (e.g., location
and direction) can uniquely define a vehicle and can be utilized to resolve the
true identity of vehicles. However, unlike static attributes, dynamic attributes
cannot be signed by a trusted authority beforehand. We propose an approach to
verify the coupling between non-certified dynamic attributes and certified static
attributes via an auxiliary laser communication channel.
Sophisticated Scheme [2] At last, we propose to use, the optical Physically
Unclonable Function (PUF) to ensure that response from the receiving vehicle
is spontaneous, rather than an answer forwarded from another vehicle. Vehicles
utilize an out-of-band optical communication channel in order to exchange the
PUF stimulated optical challenge and corresponding response from the sender
and receiver, respectively.
Claims.We provide an extended proof of the proposed scheme using Spi calculus
and BAN Logic, respectively. Our proposed approach adapts the security
construction of the conventional Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and
satisfy two crucial security properties, i.e., (i) Authentication: No active or
passive adversary would be able to intercept the communication between sender
and receiver and (ii) Secrecy: No active or passive adversary would be able to
reveal neither the secret session messages nor the secret key.
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